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Abstract 
Combat organ trafficking – reward the donor or regulate 
sales 
There is an acute shortage of transplantable human organs 
worldwide. The current systems of organ procurement cannot 
supply in the demand. A new approach is imperative. While 
countries struggle to find ways of motivating more people to 
become organ donors, the international illegal black market is 
thriving. A possible solution to the problem in South Africa might 
be to change current legislation by confirming human organ 
trafficking a specific crime as is the case in the United Kingdom. 
However, more available organs for transplantation in the cur-
rent recognised system are also essential. To achieve this, it is 
proposed that donors should be rewarded more effectively, or a 
regulated market in human organs should be allowed.  
Opsomming 
Bekamp onwettige orgaanhandel – beloon die skenker of 
wettig ’n gereguleerde orgaanmark 
Daar is wêreldwyd ’n geweldige tekort aan oorplantbare mens-
like organe. Die wyse waarop organe tans verkry word, kan nie 
in die aanvraag voorsien nie. ’n Nuwe benadering het nood-
saaklik geword. Terwyl organisasies in verskeie lande spook 
om mense te motiveer om vrywillig organe te skenk, floreer die 
                                      
1 Recognition is given to C Watson whose unpublished L.L.M. thesis “The 
organised crime of organ trafficking” (2006, University of the Free State), inspired 
me to write this article. I am also indebted to emeritus Prof. A.P.J. Roux (philo-
sophy) for his assistance; I of course remain responsible for any flaws.  
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internasionale swartmark in orgaanhandel. In Suid-Afrika is een 
moontlike oplossing om huidige wetgewing te verander deur 
orgaanhandel ’n spesifieke misdaad te maak, soos in die Ver-
enigde Koningryk. Meer organe vir oorplanting is egter in die 
erkende stelsel noodsaaklik. Om dit te bereik, word beter ver-
goeding aan skenkers aanbeveel, asook die toelating van ’n 
gereguleerde orgaanmark.   
1. Introduction 
Less than a century ago it was unthinkable to take a part from one 
human being and transplant it into another and that both of them 
could live afterwards. Today kidney transplants are nearly routine 
operations in many hospitals, although the development in medical 
technology cannot as such guarantee the availability of organs for 
transplantation. All the current methods of organ procurement have 
failed worldwide to supply in the demand. As a result, flourishing 
black markets in human organs2 have developed worldwide 
(Kishore, 2005:362), also involving South Africa. It has therefore be-
come a serious problem to secure sufficient transplant organs both 
to satisfy the need of very ill patients and to combat criminal 
activities in this field. 
The main aim of this article is to argue that monetary compensation 
to organ donors has become a must in the transplant business – 
firstly, to secure more (hopefully enough) legal organs to satisfy 
transplant needs, and secondly, in this way to curb illegal organ 
trafficking. An indication will be given of the acute shortage of trans-
plant organs worldwide and it will be shown that various legalised 
procuring systems are unsuccessful. This is done by indicating the 
organ needs in different countries and by discussing the relevant 
systems which left the deficits. It is also shown that such acute and 
continuous shortages leave a gap for illegal organ trafficking. The 
time has arrived for a new way of thinking about the way in which 
transplantable organs are to be secured. 
The phenomenon of illegal organ trafficking will then be discussed. 
As this is clearly a business, a discussion of the monetary value 
attached to different human organs is a starting point. Although the 
                                      
2 For the purpose of this article, organs refer to vital solid organs: kidneys, heart, 
liver, lungs and pancreas, but reference to organ trafficking is trafficking of 
kidneys, because the removal of all other vital organs requires the donor (seller) 
to be dead. 
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data is insufficient, it is clear that organ trafficking is serious and that 
drastic counter measures are necessary – particularly to protect 
desperate patients and tricked donors. This raises two issues: the 
content and impact of relevant legislation, and a different, more 
effective system for procuring sufficient transplant organs in a legal 
way. The South African health legislation which deals with transplant 
issues is outlined and discussed; reference is also made to other 
legislation which has a bearing on organised crime. In this dis-
cussion the British health legislation will be highlighted to indicate 
the shortcomings in the South African legislation. 
As a possible solution to the problem of insufficient transplant or-
gans, it will be suggested that a system of monetary compensation 
to voluntary donors be implemented. As this might not be sufficient 
to achieve what should be achieved, another proposal is that an 
organ market be legalised, i.e. that buying and selling of organs by 
patients and willing sellers be allowed, but regulated. The article 
ends with arguments dealing with some objections, particularly mo-
ral objections, to such a system.  
2. Organ shortages and insufficient procuring systems 
The shortage of transplantable organs is not necessarily linked to 
the system of organ procurement in a specific country. In fact, no 
procuring system can meet the demand. To procure organs the 
United States of America (Goodwin, 2006), the United Kingdom 
(Haddow, 2006:324-328) and South Africa, among others, follow a 
system of “opting-in” where the individual on a voluntarily basis, al-
truistically donates organs (Slabbert & Oosthuizen, 2007b:311-312). 
A person’s decision to be a donor is indicated by signing a donor 
card or by simply informing your next of kin about the decision to 
donate your organs (Blackbeard, 2003:47-48; Cohen, 1989:2). 
Unfortunately “the most significant aspect of this method of 
procuring transplant organs is its clear failure to secure anywhere 
near the number of organs that are required” (Goodwin, 2006:9-10, 
39, 57-83; see also Taylor, 2005:5). 
In South Africa in 2006 only 829 transplants (solid organs as well as 
corneas) were performed, whereas approximately 3 500 people 
were waiting for an organ.3 In 2002, 1 628 transplants were per-
                                      
3 South Africa has a public and a private health sector. The statistics are for both 
the sectors. There is also no national waiting list for patients waiting for an organ 
in South Africa. The figure is therefore an estimate alone (Goldstone, 2007:7).  
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formed; in 2003, 1 428; in 2004, 1 047 and in 2005, 1 084. There 
was thus a decrease of 49% from 2002 to 2006 (Goldstone, 2007:7; 
King, 2007:5). This decrease is significant as there is a need to 
transplant at least 1 000 kidneys per year. In 2005 and 2006 less 
than a quarter of these desperately needed transplants were per-
formed.4
Although the United Kingdom follows a system of “opting-in”, health 
workers always approach the family of a deceased person for their 
consent before removing the organs. Statistics show that, if the 
family did not know how the deceased would have thought about an 
organ donation, 30% will not consent to an organ removal (Haddow, 
2006:324). In 1994 the National Health Service introduced an Organ 
Donor Register in which an individual can record his/her wish to be 
an organ donor. The reasoning behind the register was that it might 
reduce the number of relatives refusing a donation, hence increas-
ing the availability of organs. Indications show that this scheme had 
limited success (Haddow, 2006:324).  
In the United States of America in 2004, 86 173 people were on the 
nation’s organ transplant waiting list, 17 patients died every day 
while waiting for an organ, whereas 115 patients were added daily to 
the waiting list (Kishore, 2005:362). In 2006 more than 93 000 pa-
tients were in need of an organ transplant, but only 14 699 trans-
plants were done (Statz, 2006:1677-1678). Apart from the “opting-in” 
system, some states in America also follow a system known as 
“required request” (discussed fully in Slabbert & Oosthuizen, 
2007a:47; see also Fourie, 2005). In this way of organ procurement, 
a person is asked to become an organ donor when admitted to a 
hospital. Despite the fact that both of these systems try to motivate 
donors, there is still a dire need for transplantable organs and the 
demand far outnumbers the supply (Goodwin, 2006:6).5  
The organ shortage is just as critical in Europe. In 2004 Austria, 
Belgium, Luxemburg, Germany, the Netherlands and Slovenia form 
part of the Euro transplant area – an organisation of the European 
                                      
4 Statistics are available on the website of the Organ Donor Foundation – a non-
governmental organisation in South Africa educating the public on organ do-
nations (http://www.odf.org.za.). 
5 “Those who can avoid America’s transplantation system will do so. They will 
bypass the American waitlist process for greater access abroad, even if that 
choice involves paying a destitute living donor and violating the law.” (Goodwin, 
2006:6.) 
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Union which monitors organ transplant activities – 15 585 people 
were on a waiting list. This is interesting because Belgium and 
Austria follow a system of “opting-out” (Taylor, 2005:24, n23) to 
cope with the organ shortage. According to this system all citizens of 
a country are considered organ donors unless the contrary is proved 
(Slabbert & Oosthuizen, 2007a:46). The main problem with this way 
of procuring organs is that it enables the state to take a person’s 
property6 without his/her consent which might undermine personal 
autonomy (Taylor, 2005:23).7 The success of this way of procuring 
organs is also dependent on an effective national data base that will 
enable medical staff to find out quickly whether a deceased person 
has indicated his/her unwillingness to be an organ donor, should the 
situation arise that his/her organs could be used for transplantation. 
In general, we may conclude that it doesn’t look as if such a 
“compulsory” system contributes to a substantial difference to the 
acute shortage of organs.  
Finally, statistics in India could also be highlighted as there are 
periodic reports of organ trafficking in India involving doctors, mid-
dlemen and even state officials. Although there are no reliable sta-
tistics on the shortage of organs in India with its population of nearly 
1,2 billion people, it is estimated that the requirement for kidney 
transplants is around 80 000 per year (150 000 patients are diag-
nosed with kidney diseases yearly) (Statz, 2006:1679), but not even 
5 000 kidney transplant operations are performed annually (Kishore, 
2005:362). The number of kidney transplants fell from an estimated 
3 600 per year in 2002 to 2 800 per year in 2003 (Statz, 2006:1679).  
Although the above statistics cover only a few countries, it clearly 
underlines the organ shortage worldwide and the failure of current 
organ procurement systems which leaves an opening for illegal 
practices to meet some of the demand. Statistics do not have mean-
ing if they are not interpreted. It could therefore be meaningful to link 
the numbers to a monetary value for each organ. By doing this, it 
might become clear why organ black markets and syndicates in-
volved in organ trafficking are active in this field. 
                                      
6 Property rights in human organs are a separate debate and will not be covered in 
this article, for a discussion on the topic see Slabbert and Oosthuizen (2007a: 52-
55; see also Charo, 2006:1517-1519). 
7 “How can a dead person ‘opt-out’? How can the uninformed relatives ‘opt-out’? 
There is no ‘opt-out’ card. Without a real opportunity to refuse donation, pre-
sumed consent looks more like a compulsory form of donation.” (Goodwin 
2006:16-18, also 117-131.) 
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3. The monetary value of transplantable human organs 
There are no specific documented values for human organs as the 
commercialisation of human organs is forbidden in most countries.8 
Nobel laureated (economics) Gary Becker and his co-worker, how-
ever, established a “market price” for a live donor kidney as a 
commodity. They are assuming that an American with a life valued 
at $3 million, earning $40 000 annually, faces a 1% risk of death 
from nephrectomy (kidney disease). The American will experience a 
5% decrease in quality of life and a loss of $7 000 in income due to 
convalescence from surgery. Therefore a kidney’s price could be 
calculated at $45 000. Using a more probable death risk of one in 
300 nephrectomies (the true reported risk is three in 10 000), the 
calculated kidney price reduces to $20 000 (Friedman & Friedman, 
2006:961). Amounts stated in media reports9 give an indication of 
what an organ (mainly kidneys) could cost on the black market. For 
South Africa it was reported that a patient in need of an organ could 
pay up to $200 000 for an illegal transplant operation (Liebenberg, 
2003:3), which will include transport costs to another country, 
medical fees as well as the cost for the organ. A syndicate operating 
in South Africa which apparently preyed on poor people in Brazil and 
Israel, offered their “clients” about $10 000 per kidney which was 
then sold for up to $120 000 (Broughton, 2003a:1; Goodwin, 
2006:158-159). The British Broadcasting Corporation reported on 
impoverished Indians in Madras who were exploited by organ 
vendors. One poor woman had earned $750 for a healthy kidney, 
whereas the recipient, a Singaporean, paid $37 000 for it, most of 
which went to the middleman (BBC News Online, 2002). 
                                      
8 See a table of legislation banning organ sales in other countries in Garwood-
Gowers (1999:ix; see also Taylor, 2005:12). The kidney trade is legal and regu-
lated in Iran. The trade is organised and controlled by two government-endorsed 
NGOs. Regulations have also been put into place to prevent transplant tourism 
(Ram, 2002). See also “Pakistan’s lucrative kidney trade” – unlike the rest of the 
world there are no laws restricting the sale of organs in Pakistan and no 
regulation requiring informed consent of potential donors (CNN, 2007).    
9 Reference is made to newspaper articles as the information has not yet been 
recorded in books or journals. Pearson, (2004:5, 11) stated: “... detailed and 
accurate information related to removal of organs is lacking, as are any pro-
grammes to combat organ trafficking. … There are no statistics on the extent of 
kidney trafficking per sé. … There have been no studies regarding the extent of 
organ trafficking, and as with other forms of trafficking, it is extremely difficult to 
measure due to its clandestine nature.”  
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Organs are also advertised on the internet,10 some under the cover 
of being a donation. Advertisements usually read that the donor will 
be compensated for time lost at work but will not be paid for the 
organ itself.11 By advertising in this way the advertiser makes sure 
that no laws are broken, however, if the amounts offered are taken 
into consideration it seems as if the organ is in fact paid for.  
Approximately 5 500 kidneys are sold in India every year, with an 
annual turnover of Rs90 crore (Indian currency) (Watson, 2006:54-
55). In the United States of America an illegal kidney transplant 
costs up to $100 000 and in certain areas of Kenya where the organ 
trade is flourishing, a person can illegally purchase skin and other 
organs for over $1 800 (Watson, 2006:54-55). In Turkey the price of 
a kidney is approximately $2 700 and rare organs will trade for as 
high as $150 000 per item, while the price for organs in Bosnia is 
$68 000. Some recipients indicated that they have paid up to 
$200 000 extra for the illegal transplant to take place, while the mid-
dleman who arranged the sale of the organ, receives an estimated 
$55 000 (Watson, 2006:54-55). 
Many Saudi kidney patients go to the Philippines for an illegal trans-
plant. The cost of kidney transplants there ranges from $40 000 to 
$50 000. About 60% of this amount goes to the hospital and medical 
team and the rest goes to the donors (Ananena, 2007). The Kidney 
Foundation of the Philippines indicated that the donor should not get 
less than 300 000 pesos (about $6 000), however, the black market 
rate is much lower, with the donor getting only between 75 000 to 
150 000 pesos of which 30 000 pesos go to the pocket of the local 
middleman (Ananena, 2007).  
It is clear that human organs have monetary value and at present 
the vital organs can fetch relative high prices. Given the shortage 
and the demand for organs, organ trafficking has to be expected. 
                                      
10 Daniel Tuck of the United Kingdom tried to sell one of his kidneys over the 
internet to settle gambling debt. He was found guilty of contravening sec. 32 of 
the Human Tissue Act of 2004 and got a twelve months suspended jail sentence 
(Times-online, 2007). See also http://www.guardian.co.uk/gambling/story/0. 
2078157.00.html (The Guardian, 2007). 
11 S 60(4) of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 (South Africa, 2003b) also states 
that a donor may be reimbursed for reasonable costs incurred by him/her to 
provide a donation. On 3 September 1999 the bidding for a human kidney offered 
on the internet auction site eBay hit $5,7 million before it was stopped due to 
broken rules of eBay, prohibiting the sale of organs (Broughton, 2003a:1).   
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The present legal situation in South Africa is discussed a little later, 
but it should be remarked that it is specifically the payments for 
middlemen who organise these illegal sales as part of a syndicate, 
operating across borders, that necessitates a review of current 
legislation.  
4. Organ trafficking 
The most common type of organ trafficking, is cases of people who 
agree to sell their organs and then enter into a formal or informal 
contract to do so. However, once the kidney is removed these 
people are, more often than not, cheated and not paid at all, or they 
are paid only half, or a fraction of the initially agreed upon price. 
Organised crime plays a role in the form of brokers and middlemen 
coercing the poor to sell their kidneys (and corneas) by offering 
economic incentives. Brokers and surgeons frequently lie about the 
procedures and consequences of kidney removal. For example, they 
tell the sellers that “the operation is a minor one, that they can return 
to work immediately, that one kidney is ‘useless’ or dormant so this 
one will be removed etc.” (Pearson, 2004:10).  
To this we may add that most organised and even non-organised 
crimes are economically driven as market forces create opportuni-
ties for legitimate business as well as organised crime – “They are 
both operating according to the law of demand and supply, but only 
at different positions within the spectrum of legitimacy.” (Leong, 
2004:23.) In other words, as long as there is the huge demand for 
transplantable organs, there will be a market for illegal sales and 
there will be illegal entrepreneurs willing to organise such sales, 
usually on a cash basis. 
4.1 Other countries 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, a member of Organ Watch – a non-govern-
mental organisation against the sale of human organs, based at the 
University of California – documented that organ trafficking hap-
pened in many parts of the world; notably Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, 
Israel, Turkey, South Africa, the United States of America, the 
United Kingdom and India (Ram, 2002). Her research shows that 
abuses associated with kidney transplants occur all over the world in 
various forms “… the abuses range from the harvesting of organs 
from executed prisoners in China to the removal of organs from 
dead bodies in Argentina and South Africa without the permission 
and knowledge of the families of the dead” (Ram, 2002).  
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She12 met a medical doctor based in the United States of America 
who arranged for patients around the world to get organs, who 
remarked: “Don’t think of me as an outlaw; think of me as a new 
version of the old-fashioned marriage broker. I locate and match up 
people in need.” (Scheper-Hughes, 2004.) The reality is that if goods 
or services happened to be outlawed and there is a demand for 
them, illegal enterprises will emerge to meet the demand (Leong, 
2004:19).  
The Transplantation of Human Organs Act 42 of 1994 came into 
operation in 1995 in India. This Act stipulates that transplants are 
only allowed between immediate family members. The Act only be-
comes effective after ratification by the different legislative assem-
blies of the states under the Indian Constitution. Only 31 States 
have done so, and five have not – commercial transplants therefore 
continue to be legal in those states (Jha & Chung, 2001:242). India 
is an ideal destination for organ trafficking, for it has a vast 
impoverished population, there is a lack of effective legislation, as 
indicated, and there are trained and available surgeons and 
physicians. There are also a lot of very enterprising middlemen (Jha 
& Chung, 2001:246).   
There are also reports of transplant tourism from Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, Oman and Kuwait, initially to India but later to Turkey, Iran 
and Iraq and recently to Russia, Romania and Moldova, where 
kidney sellers are recruited (Allais, 2004). 
4.2 South Africa 
In South Africa in 2003 a syndicate13 involved in the sale of human 
organs was exposed. An Israeli patient bought a kidney from a 
Brazilian for R37 000, the middleman who organised the sale re-
ceived R280 000 (Ekron & Brits, 2003b:3). In December 2003 one of 
the Durban co-ordinators of the kidney-selling syndicate who was 
                                      
12 Scheper-Hughes (2004) has written numerous articles on the organ trade. For an 
interview with her, see Scheper-Hughes (2004). 
13 A syndicate is defined as: (1) A group of individuals or organisations combined or 
making a joint effort to undertake some specific duty or carry out specific trans-
actions. (2) A group, combination or association of gangsters controlling or-
ganised crime or one type of crime, especially in one region of the country. (3) A 
loose affiliation of gangsters in charge of organise crime. A Gang is defined as a 
group of persons associated for some criminal or other antisocial purpose 
http://dictionary.reference.com  Date of access: 7 Nov. 2007. 
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charged with contravening the Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 
confessed to 78 charges of organising illegal organ transplants for 
two years. The syndicate operated between Israel, Brazil and South 
Africa (cf. Ekron & Brits, 2003b:3; Liebenberg, 2005:14; Broughton, 
2003a:1; Ekron & Brits, 2003a:1; Ayoob, 2004:1; Broughton, 2003b: 
5; Power, 2006:6). In 2006 an Israeli businessman who allegedly 
headed the syndicate was arrested in Germany. He organised more 
than 100 illegal kidney transplants at the St. Augustine’s Hospital in 
Durban (Power, 2006:6; Goodwin, 2006:187-189). Despite wide 
media coverage, the charges against the accused and others, with 
the exception of the few who confessed to contravening the Human 
Tissue Act (1983), were dropped.  
The National Prosecuting Authority defended the withdrawal of the 
case on the grounds that the state was considering the extradition 
from Russia of two more suspects and the state had been given 
numerous witness statements in Israel which needed to be trans-
lated from Hebrew in order to further more arrests (Power, 2006:6). 
Organ Watch reported that in South Africa dialysis and transplanta-
tions have been classified as “tertiary health care” and this is not 
provided by the state to everyone.14 “Dialysis and transplantation 
are the privilege of a relatively small section of society that can af-
ford expensive treatment in private hospitals.” (Ram, 2002; Scheper-
Hughes, 2003.) South Africa has a private and public health care 
system. There is no national register where every transplant done is 
recorded. This leaves the door open for transplants to be performed, 
especially in the private sector, without any questions asked. It is a 
requirement in South African hospitals that a donor should be blood 
related to the recipient or the donor could be a patient’s spouse. Yet 
in the private sector it is possible that few questions are asked or 
research done to determine whether this is in fact the case. The 
prospective “donor” (actually the seller) may be coached by the 
organisers of the transplant to act as a relative of the patient 
(Broughton, 2003b:5; Nair, 2005:1). Because of this lack of control 
or direction in legislation, South Africa is labelled an ideal country for 
illegal organ transplants.  
                                      
14 In South African public hospitals it is practise to accommodate a patient only until 
the age of 55 on a dialysis programme if the hospital has enough facilities. The 
patient should also not have any other illnesses (Pienaar, 2004:6). See also 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) 
and a discussion of this case in Slabbert and Oosthuizen (2007b:319-321).  
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Organised crime is also becoming a global phenomenon. Nowadays 
there is a new threat of transnational organised crime (Ram, 
2002).15 Once again this is exactly what happened in the Durban or-
gan scandal. Development in technology made it easy for the 
criminals to expand their markets across borders (Israel and Brazil). 
Again, legislation in this regard is also imperative.  
A final remark on the issue of syndicates involved in organ traf-
ficking: organ sales do not happen in isolation; many people are part 
of the crime, making it easy to be labelled “an organised crime”. The 
question arises whether “organised crime” refers to an act or to a 
group (Leong, 2004:19).16 On the one hand “organised crime” 
seems to refer to an act, e.g. the sale of human organs. On the 
other hand, it also refers to a group of people (offenders) involved in 
the specific crime, for example in the Durban case – the doctors in 
the transplant unit, the transplant co-ordinators, the sellers and the 
middlemen were all involved. It thus seems that “organised crime” 
should include both the “act” and the people involved – the 
syndicate. The concept organised is a bit problematic, because it is 
not clear what organise includes. It may simply refer to a well-
planned operation which is. One can argue that the sale of the 
organs in Durban was part of organised crime. The group, although 
it consists only of short term partnerships, operated in a smooth 
well-planned way; the group thus have all or most of the attributes of 
other criminal organisations. However, because the people involved 
usually take part on a cash basis and only as the need arises, one 
can also argue that the undertaking is as such unorganised, con-
sisting of isolated acts and that different legislation should apply. In 
other words the question to be answered is whether the Prevention 
of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 or the Prevention and Com-
bating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 are applicable here or not. 
The courts will have to interpret the legislation as it is not clear 
whether these acts are applicable on syndicates organising human 
organ trafficking or not (cf. also Burchell, 2006:970-1019 for a 
discussion on organised crime and the Acts). 
                                      
15 The future will have to determine whether the International Co-operation in 
Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996 is applicable in organ trafficking or not.  
16 For definitions on organised crime see Burchell (2006:974-976). 
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5. Legislation concerning organ transplants 
5.1 South Africa 
During the interim period, the Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 regu-
lates the procurement of human organs in South Africa. In the near 
future the National Health Act 61 of 2003 will regulate it.17
5.1.1 The Human Tissue Act 65 of 198318
As indicated earlier, South Africa has an “opting-in” system of organ 
procurement. Section 2 of the Act explains who may donate organs 
of a deceased person and under which circumstances (Blackbeard, 
2003:47-48). The moment of death is not addressed in the Act and 
this Act does not recognise brainstem death as death.19 This is a 
shortcoming in the Act as the moment of death is extremely im-
portant in the transplant context – all organs except for a kidney, 
may only be removed from a person’s body for transplantation 
purposes, if he/she is declared brain dead and the blood circulation 
continues albeit by artificial means. 
Section 18 of the Act prescribes how a living person may donate an 
organ (a kidney). It is practice in South African hospitals to accept 
donations from living persons only if they are related by blood to the 
patient in need of a transplant, or if the donor is the patient’s spouse. 
If the source of the donation is a friend or an altruistic acquaintance, 
an application has to be made to the Department of Health, who will 
investigate the matter and only after it has been determined that the 
donation is not for financial gain, permission will be granted for the 
operation to be carried out. This is because section 28 of the Human 
Tissue Act (South Africa,1983) prohibits the payment for donated 
                                      
17 The National Health Act with the exception of several chapters (including Chapter 
8 on organ transplants) came into effect on 2 May 2005. Section 93(1) of the Act 
repeals the Human Tissue Act in total, but it will only be done on a date fixed by 
the President in a Government Gazette. In the interim the Human Tissue Act and 
its regulations remain in force. 
18  For a detailed discussion on the Human Tissue Act as well as the National Health 
Act, and the influence of the Constitution of the Repulblic of South Africa (1996) 
on these Acts, see Slabbert and Oosthuizen (2007b:304-323). Note also that 
mentioning the Human Tissue Act is relevant as the contraventions of illegal trade 
in human organs in South Africa occurred when this Act was still effective.   
19 See S 7(2) of the Human Tissue Act (South Africa, 1983) for an explanation on 
how death should be determined. See also Slabbert (2002) for a discussion on 
brain death. 
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organs. It is accepted that family members or spouses will not 
charge the patient for the organ, but strangers might have other 
motives.  
In terms of section 28 of the Act (South Africa, 1983) it is thus illegal 
to sell or buy an organ. This allegedly happened in at least 109 
kidney transplants done at St. Augustine’s Hospital between June 
2001 and November 2003 (Kockot, 2005). Apart from transgressing 
the law, this alleged trafficking of donors into South Africa also 
contravened an international protocol aimed at preventing the 
trafficking of people for exploitation, including the removal of their 
organs. The South African government and more than 80 other 
countries signed the Palmero Protocol in December 2000 in an effort 
“to prevent and suppress the trafficking in human persons” (Kockot, 
2005). The definition for human trafficking includes the recruitment 
of persons by deception, abuse of power or position of vulnerability, 
or the giving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a 
person for the purpose of exploitation.  
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation or the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced labour services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the removal of organs (emphasis – MS).20 (United 
Nations, 2000.) 
Article 5 of the Protocol requires that countries that signed the 
Protocol must adopt such legislative and other measures that may 
be necessary to establish as criminal offences the conduct set forth 
in this Protocol, when committed intentionally. This means that had 
South Africa introduced legislation to support this Protocol, people 
allegedly involved in recruiting kidney donors (sellers) might also 
have faced charges of human trafficking (Kockot, 2005). At this 
stage, no such laws exist, although the Department of Health has 
indicated that legislation governing live donor transplants will be 
tightened.21
                                      
20 Art. 3 of the Protocol: “To prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, es-
pecially women and children, supplementing the United Nations convention 
against transnational organized crime.” (Palmero Protocol; United Nations, 2000.) 
21 See also Pearson (2004): at 6 “Criminal Laws should be amended so that brokers 
and medical staff involved in transplantation procedures are criminally respons-
ible whilst donor-sellers are specifically free from criminal responsibility unless 
directly involved in trafficking others.” And: at 7 “National laws should be modified 
in order to prevent abuse of organ transplantations.”   
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5.1.2 The National Health Act 61 of 2003 
The National Health Act recognises brainstem death as death (see 
s. 1: “Definitions”: death is brain death; South Africa, 2003b). 
Section 62 of this Act lists the same requirements for an organ 
donation from a deceased body as the Human Tissue Act.22 Section 
55 prescribes how a living person may donate an organ. 
An interesting difference between the National Health Act and the 
Human Tissue Act is section 60, concerning the payment in connec-
tion with the acquisition of an organ. Section 60(4)(a) states that a 
donor of an organ may be reimbursed for reasonable costs incurred 
by him/her in relation to the donation. “Reasonable costs” are not 
defined in the Act. This will hopefully be done in the Regulations to 
follow the enactment of chapter 8 of the National Health Act 61 of 
2003. If reasonable costs are not defined in the Regulations to 
follow, the door will again be open for illegal payments for organs as 
costs paid for the donations might include an amount for the organ 
itself.   
5.2 The United Kingdom 
5.2.1 Human Tissue Act 2004 (c. 30) 
The Human Tissue Act which received Royal assent on 15 Novem-
ber 2004 repealed and replaced the Human Organ Transplantation 
Act of 1989 that was passed in response to a scandal involving the 
removal of kidneys from Turkish citizens for the benefit of British 
patients (Harrington, 2006). The Human Organ Transplantation Act 
prohibited commercial dealings in organs, including trafficking be-
tween other countries and Britain. “Notwithstanding these measures, 
organ tourism from Britain to Third World countries was flourishing.” 
(Harrington, 2006.) 
The Human Tissue Act 2004 specifically prohibits dealing in human 
material for transplantation. The purpose of the Act is to provide a 
consistent legislative framework for issues relating to whole body 
donation and the taking, storage and use of human organs and 
tissue. Consent is made for the fundamental principle underpinning 
the lawful storage and use of human bodies, body parts, organs and 
tissue and the removal of material from the bodies of deceased 
                                      
22 For minor differences between the two acts see Slabbert and Oosthuizen 
(2007b:306-311.) 
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persons. The Act arose from concern raised by events at Bristol 
Royal Infirmary and the Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital (Alder 
Hey) in 1999-2000. The Kennedy and Redfern inquiries at these 
hospitals established that organs and tissue from children who had 
died had often been removed, stored and used without proper con-
sent. A subsequent census by the Chief medical officer for England 
(2000) and the Isaacs report (2003) (United Nations, 2000) showed 
that storage and use of organs and tissue from both adults and 
children without proper consent have been widespread in the past. 
The section on trafficking, section 32, transposes the prohibition on 
buying and selling organs from the Human Organ Transplant Act, 
and extends the prohibition to cover all human material (subject to 
certain exceptions) intended to be used for transplantation. Subsec-
tion (1) stipulates that a person commits an offence if 
• he gives or receives a reward for the supply of or for an offer to 
supply any controlled material; 
• seeks to find a person willing to supply any controlled material for 
reward;23 
• offers to supply any controlled material for reward; 
• initiates or negotiates any arrangement involving the giving of a 
reward for the supply of, or for an offer to supply, any controlled 
material; 
• takes part in the management or control of a body of persons 
corporate or unincorporate whose activities consists of or include 
the initiation or negotiation of such arrangements. 
According to subsection 2 advertising for suppliers of material for 
reward is also prohibited. Subsection 7 provides that reimbursement 
for expenses connected with transporting, removing, preparing, pre-
serving or storing the body of a deceased person or relevant human 
material is not prohibited. The section also provides that it is not an 
offence to provide expenses or recompense for loss of earnings 
given to an individual supplying human material and it allows for 
costs incurred by others to be passed along a chain of suppliers 
(Anon., 2007). In other words, according to this new legislation in the 
United Kingdom a donor may be compensated for reasonable costs 
                                      
23 Reward in the Human Tissue Act 2004 means any description of financial or other 
material advantage (S 32(11); United Kingdom, 2004.) 
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incurred with the donation, similar to the position of the National 
Health Act in South Africa.  
If the South African Human Tissue Act is compared to the Human 
Tissue Act of the United Kingdom there is a definite shortcoming in 
South African law – British legislation addresses the crime of organ 
trafficking, but it is not addressed in South African law. In South 
Africa the crime of paying for human organs is defined in legislation 
of the Department of Health instead of it being described as a crime 
by the Department of Justice. 
6. Possible solutions to the crime of illegal organ sales 
The shortage of transplantable organs is a fact proven by the num-
ber of patients on waiting lists. These numbers unfortunately do not 
tell the full story about the shortage – especially with reference to 
kidneys, as the statistics do not indicate the number of patients on 
dialysis either at home or on hospital programmes. Neither do the 
statistics indicate all the other patients waiting for other vital organs. 
The waiting lists are merely a reflection of those patients who ended 
up with the right medical practitioners. Current methods of organ 
procurement have failed to supply in the demand and the call for 
change are becoming louder and louder. One alternative is to con-
sider implementing financial incentives to donors (Haddow, 2006: 
324). Such a move will, however, still not guarantee enough organs. 
Other alternatives should be available for those with greater financial 
resources and thereby freeing altruism to work for those who are 
truly the most vulnerable, particularly economically disenfranchised 
patients (Goodwin, 2006:40).  
If direct commercialisation of human organs is unacceptable to 
countries, they should at least consider compensating the donor, as 
this does not necessarily lead to the donor being exploited. Expect-
ing the donor to take the trouble, the pain, et cetera to donate a 
kidney on an unpaid basis is exploitative (Radcliff-Richards, 1991: 
190-192). Most jurisdictions, including South Africa, do not provide 
for any compensation of donor losses as a matter of right. “It leaves 
some donors suffering a ‘double whammy’ of physical damage and 
financial hardship from their activities and this is totally unaccept-
able.” (Garwood-Gowers, 1999:192; cf. also Blackbeard 2002:52-
83.) 
Garwood-Gowers (1999:192-193) proposes that the donor should at 
least be compensated for the pain and suffering, the “labour” similar 
to rates given to medical research volunteers, their normal wage that 
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they would earn daily, travel expenses to and from the hospital (also 
during the testing phase), childcare – if the donor is a mother and 
she has to pay someone to look after her children – and accommo-
dation, if applicable. 
As indicated earlier, the new National Health Act in South Africa and 
the Human Tissue Act in the United Kingdom provide for “reason-
able costs” to be paid in connection with a donation. Although this is 
definitely a step in the right direction it also raises concerns as to 
who will control/investigate the fees paid and who will determine the 
reasonableness thereof? Will it be possible to conceal within the 
amount paid a sum for the organ itself? In short, though such a 
system of compensation does not raise serious ethical or humani-
tarian concerns – in fact it seems the moral way to go – it does lead 
to all kinds of financial and regulative problems which will have to be 
considered carefully. However, if monetary compensation is in order, 
and seeing that South Africa is a free market country, the question is 
whether we should not go the whole way and legalise organ sales 
by regulating such a practice. 
Arguments against the sale of human organs are not new and they 
seem to be similar worldwide (Pearson, 2004:15-27). The most com-
mon arguments are that the autonomy of the poor will be compro-
mised, that removing an organ is harmful, that the sale of organs will 
commodify human beings which will violate human dignity and lastly 
the vague argument that selling organs is unethical or immoral.24
Considering the arguments that selling an organ is unethical or that 
an organ market is immoral, different answers can be argued. First-
ly, regarding the illusion of a morality of scale, Friedman and Fried-
man ask “Just what is so ethically wrong?” They continue by asking 
why it is worse to sell a kidney than selling sperm or egg cells, as 
the latter two should be more morally questionable than organ sales 
because those cells might create an entirely new human being 
(Friedman & Friedman, 2006:961-962). According to Beauchamp 
(2003:272) two moral questions about selling kidneys need to be 
answered, namely: Will it always be morally wrong for an individual 
to sell a kidney? And, is there an adequate moral basis to justify the 
commercialisation of organs? With reference to the first question, he 
is convinced that such a generalisation cannot hold water. This is 
                                      
24 For an in depth discussions on all these points of criticism see Slabbert and 
Oosthuizen (2007a:55-60).  
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the demand that moral sales allow no exception. Beauchamp 
(2003:272) uses the following example: 
Suppose that my wealthy cousin will perish without a kidney; he 
offers me $ 100 000 for one of mine. I am well informed about 
the current and lifetime risks of nephrectomy, and I could put 
the $ 100 000 to good use in reducing a burdensome mortgage. 
I understand my cousin well, and he understands me equally 
well. Limitation of our liberty would require a compelling justifi-
cation for preventing us from entering into a relationship that will 
benefit me financially and will save his life. 
The dilemma gets even more troublesome when another life is at 
stake. Say instead of a mortgage the possible donor has to pay for 
life saving heart surgery on his child?  
With a market for kidneys Beauchamp (2003:272) has certain reser-
vations depending on whether it is a local open market, a regulated 
market or an international market. Irrespective of the market at 
hand, he came to the conclusion that the selling or purchasing of a 
kidney need not involve disrespect for persons and is not in itself a 
ground for moral repulsion or indignation. What worries him more is 
that markets in organs might invariably lead to some form of exploi-
tation.  
De Castro (2003:142) differs by saying that compensation for organs 
does not necessarily lead to exploitation – on the contrary, it may be 
regarded as a necessity in efforts to minimise the level of exploi-
tation that already exists in the current organ procurement systems.   
• Exploitation of the poor 
Many authors have expressed concern that the poor will be so 
focused on the money they will receive for their organ that they will 
not understand the procedure and the risks involved with the 
removal of a kidney. Money and intellect are not dependant on each 
other; poor people are not necessarily ill informed or unable to 
consent. Moreover, poor people also have rights and dignity. Good 
medical practice demands proper counselling in order for a donor to 
give informed consent (Savulescu, 2003:138-139). The medical 
tests and procedures also ensure that the donors are cared for and 
that there is time for reflection. Beauchamp (2003:272) sums it up by 
saying “those who sell their kidneys are at risk of exploitation, it does 
not follow that a ban on the sale of kidneys is the best way to 
address these problems”. 
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• Removing an organ is harmful (Wilkinson & Garrard, 
1996:334) 
People are allowed to donate an organ only after medical tests have 
been done and doctors are satisfied with the health status of both 
the patient and the organ. The fact that money exchanges hands 
should make no difference to professionalism where everything is 
above board (Slabbert & Oosthuizen, 2007a:57). Research done at 
Minnesota University in the United States of America showed that a 
person could have a healthy life with one kidney and that the 
removal of a kidney doesn’t necessarily have a negative impact on a 
donor (Rothman, 1998:15).  
• Commodification of the human body 
Commodification of the body is difficult to describe. Are undertakers 
commodifiers of the body? What about opera singers who “sell” and 
“live by” their voices? They even insure it. Body parts are already 
commodified on black markets (Savulescu, 2003:138). Donors and 
recipients have been negotiating terms of organ transfers with or 
without the sanction of legal authorities. “In a way it is the un-
deniable existence of the demand and the corresponding supply that 
commodifies human organs even before anyone tried to put a price 
tag on to [sic] them” (De Castro, 2003:145). Commodification is a 
fact. People sell their labour (in that sense themselves), make mo-
ney with their voices, et cetera. This seems an arbitrary boundary. 
That it is a fact does not say it is right, but at what stage, under what 
circumstances does it become wrong? 
As long as human organ sales are not prosecuted everywhere or 
criminalised only in some countries the black market for selling 
organs will not stop. In this era of instantaneous communication 
through the internet and air travel being relatively cheap, needy 
patients will look beyond borders and laws imposed by their own 
countries. If they can legally buy a kidney at home and pay a fair 
price excluding a middleman not only will they benefit, but the organ 
shortage especially for kidneys might be alleviated. 
All these objections tread on moral sensitivities. In other words, the 
basic question is whether a regulated, legal organ market can be 
morally justified. To answer this question we have to bear in mind 
that we live in a multi-cultural society and a direct answer cannot be 
given. There are many ethical perspectives, approaches and diffe-
rent values. Cottingham (1998:20) with his idea of “a committee 
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ethics” and Engelhardt25 (1992:12) with his idea of “limited (moral) 
solidarity” help one to get to some answer by emphasising the value 
of ongoing fundamental discussion so as to reach some kind of 
consensus – a general, rather vague, set of principles which provide 
a common framework whilst leaving sufficient lee-way to different 
approaches. In South Africa our constitution which is the outcome of 
exactly this kind of negotiation and thus a form of “committee ethics” 
or “limited solidarity” provides us with a sort of common moral sys-
tem and common values. The nearest we can get to an answer 
about moral acceptability of legal organ sales is to test it against the 
Constitution and the Declaration of Human Rights. It fits the basic 
right to life which has an active side26 as in self-defence – a patient 
has to be in a position to contribute to, take part in his staying alive 
and ensuring a certain quality of life. It further allows for personal 
autonomy in two ways. The patient whose life depends on a 
transplant can do something he/she can actively participate in by 
trying to find a willing seller. On the other hand, there is no 
compulsion; it is for the patient to decide which option he/she wants 
to choose. In short, to allow a market is the just way to go. To deny 
a terminally ill patient the opportunity to participate actively in a 
search for a vital organ even if it includes payment, constitutes a 
form of dogmatic oppression which would be unjust. The same 
applies in the case of the willing seller who should not be deprived of 
an opportunity to improve his/her position. Thus, justice demands 
that the market option should be available to those who wish to use 
it. 
7. Conclusion 
At the beginning of this article it was indicated that there is a 
worldwide shortage of transplantable organs. The current methods 
                                      
25 Engelhardt (1992:12) concludes commercialisation of organ transfers is not per 
se wrong. “In the absence of an appeal to the particular religious or ideological 
understanding the proper role of commerce in organs and bodies, there will not 
be a way to determine when commercialisation in human organs is morally 
improper.” 
26 See in this regard specifically O’Reagan in S. v Makwanyane 1995(3) SA 391 
(CC) para 326 where the “right to life” is framed in terms which go beyond 
traditional conceptions of the right not to lose one’s life at the hands of the state to 
embrace the right to live with dignity: “the right to live as a human being, to be 
part of a broader community, to share in the experience of humanity”. See also 
Slabbert (2002:75-78) and for an in depth discussion of medical ethics and the 
sale of human organs, see Slabbert and Oosthuizen (2007b:314-321).  
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of organ procurement cannot supply in the ever increasing demand. 
Altruism may be the noblest form of giving, especially in the context 
of organ donation, but how many people have to die before we re-
think our procurement strategy? (Goodwin, 2006:9). “The incom-
petence of altruism has meant service for some and death for many 
others.” (Goodwin, 2006:40.)  
Black markets are flourishing to the detriment of the person giving 
up his/her kidney, as the middlemen seem to be the parties bene-
fiting the most financially. These illegal practices will not end, but will 
continue to thrive until it is replaced with a viable alternative (Good-
win, 2006:190). Technology has also made it easier to look for or-
gans across borders and therefore black markets are not linked only 
to specific countries. The crime of organ trafficking, whether it exists 
or whether it is only a few isolated incidences, needs to be stopped 
(Garwood-Gowers, 1999:191).  
A few suggestions for combating illegal organ sales in South Africa 
have been proposed. The first possibility is to change the system of 
organ procurement to that of “opting-out” – the negative aspects of 
such a system have also been highlighted. Another solution may be 
tighter applicable legislation for example, to make organ trafficking a 
specific crime or to make acts like the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act directly applicable to illegal organ sales. For the present, 
it is not clear who is criminally responsible for the crime of organ 
trafficking. The problem is furthermore that offenders are never 
really discouraged by legislation forbidding certain actions; they just 
use certain loopholes to by-pass the law.   
Two better alternatives are to compensate the donor or to legalise 
the sale of human organs by regulating it nationally and internatio-
nally (Harrington, 2006; also Josefson, 2002:446).  
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Key concepts: 
black markets in organs 
exploitation of the poor 
organ donations 
organ procurement 
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Kernbegrippe: 
eksploitasie van armes 
orgaanoorplantings 
orgaanverhandeling/orgaanverkope 
orgaanverkryging 
swartmark 
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Combat organ trafficking – reward the donor or regulate sales  
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